State v. Kraly Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 42580 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
9-22-2015
State v. Kraly Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42580
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Kraly Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42580" (2015). Not Reported. 2042.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2042
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) NO. 42580 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) BONNER COUNTY NO. CR 2014-838 
v. ) 
) 
SHANE ANTHONY KRAL Y, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BONNER 
HONORABLE BARBARA BUCHANAN 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B.#5867 
ERIC D. FRDERICKSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #6555 
P.O. Box 2816 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
SEP 2 2 2015 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......... . .......... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .. . . .......... ········· ... 1 
Nature of the Case ....... . . ................. . 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ...... . ...................... 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL. •• •« •••••••••••••• 4 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 5 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kraly's Motion 
To Suppress Because Officer Inman Did Not Have 
Reasonable Suspicion To Detain Him .......................................................... 5 
A. Introduction. . .. .. . ... . .... . . . . .. . ................ 5 
8. Standard Of Review ......... . 
.. ..... ········· ... 5 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kraly's Motion To 
Suppress Because His Detention Was Illegal And, Therefore, 
Any Evidence Collected Must Be Suppressed As Fruit Of 
Illegal Government Activity......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . ...................... 5 
1. Officer lnman's Initial Contact With Mr. Kraly Was A Seizure 
Because A Reasonable Person In Mr. Kraly's Position 
Would Not Have Felt Free To Leave .................................................... 6 
2. Officer Inman Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To 
Detain Mr. Kraly . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ 8 
D. All Evidence Collected Following The Illegal Detention Must 
Be Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of The Illegal Governmental 
Activity ............................................................................................. 9 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. 10 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................ 11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) .... .. ...... ... . .......................... 7 
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) ................................................... 9 
State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245 ( 1990) ....................................................... 9 
State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736 (Ct. App. 2005) ................................................. 9 
State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297 (Ct App. 2006) ................................................ 5 
State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924 (1993).. ......... .... ... . ........ ..... .. ................... 8 
State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100 (1991). ........... .......... . ..... . . . .. ..................... 6 
State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655 (2007) ................ . . ........ .............. 6 
State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821 (Ct App. 2002) ... .. ............ ......... 6 
State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610 (2000) ........................................................ 6 
State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841 (2004) ............................................................. 6 
State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652 (1999) .................... .......... ..... .. ..................... 6 
State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260 (Ct. App. 2001) .... .. ...... ... ........ ..8 
State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613 (Ct. App. 1997) ........ . . .................. 9 
State v. Waldie, 126 Idaho 864 (Ct. App. 1995).... .. .. .. ............ . . ................... 6 
State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180 (Ct. App. 2005) ...................................... 9 
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482 (2009) ....................................................... 7 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968) ................................................ 6, 8 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ........................................ 9 
Statutes 
Idaho Code section 49-316 .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. . . .. .. . . . .. . .. . .. .. . . .. . . . 7 
ii 
Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Const amend. IV .................................................................. 5 
Ill 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Shane Anthony Kraly entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of 
attempted possession of methamphetamine, preserving his right to challenge the district 
court's order denying his Motion to Suppress. Mr. Kraly asserts that the district court 
erred in denying his Motion to Suppress because the police detained him without 
reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
At 8:00 p.m., Officer Inman saw a car parked in a parking lot. (Tr., p.47, Ls.13-
20.)1 The car was the only car in the lot and was parked perpendicular to the parking 
lines. (Tr., p.48, L.4 - p.52, L.9.) Officer Inman saw two people in the car and he 
parked his patrol car in front of the car so that his headlights were shining into the car's 
windshield. (Tr., p.53, L.15 - p.55, L.9.) Officer Inman was wearing a police uniform 
and driving a marked police patrol car. (Tr., p.53, L.22 - p.54, L.6.) He walked up to 
the driver's side window of the car and made contact with Mr. Kraly, who was in the 
driver's seat, and Tiffany Baldwin, who was in the front passenger seat. (Tr., p 56, L.3. 
- p.57, L.24.) Officer Inman shined his flashlight inside the car and in Ms. Baldwin's 
face. (Tr., p.57, Ls.16-24.) Officer Inman asked Mr. Kraly what they were doing. 
(Tr., p.57, Ls.3-5.) Mr. Kraly responded that he and Ms. Baldwin were spending some 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, transcript citations refer to the transcript of the Motion to 
Suppress hearing held on May 20, 2014, which begins on page 44 of the primary 
transcript. 
1 
alone time together. (Tr., p.57, Ls.6-7.) Because Mr. Kraly was "fidgety," Officer Inman 
he may be using a stimulant, so he asked to see both of their identifications. 
, p.58, Ls.4-9.) Mr. Kraly did not his identifications, but he gave the name 
"Robert Kraly." (Tr., p.58, Ls.11-13.) Ms. Baldwin gave Officer Inman her license and 
told him that she thought she had a warrant for her arrest. (Tr., p.58, Ls.13-15.) Officer 
Inman took the identification back to his patrol car and radioed for another officer, who 
arrived with a drug dog. (Tr., p.59, Ls.2-4.) Ms. Baldwin did in fact have a warrant for 
her arrest, and officers arrested her. (Tr., p.60, Ls.17-20, p.62, Ls.10-16.) When 
Ms. Baldwin got out of the car, there was a syringe on the passenger seat. (Tr., p.62, 
Ls.14-18.) Another officer deployed the drug dog, and the dog alerted on the car. 
(Tr., p.66, Ls.2-4.) Police searched the car and found methamphetamine and 
paraphernalia. (Tr., p.66, Ls.9-16.) 
Mr. Kraly was charged with one count of possession of methamphetamine. 
(R., pp.63-64.) He filed a Motion to Suppress, wherein he argued that Officer Inman 
illegally detained him and, therefore, the evidence found in the car should be 
suppressed. (R., pp.92-99, 107-117.) The district court denied Mr. Kraly Motion to 
Suppress and found that the initial contact between Officer Inman and Mr. Kraly was 
consensual, and that a seizure did not occur until Ms. Baldwin told Officer Inman that 
she had an outstanding arrest warrant. (R., pp.130-34.) The court further found that 
once Ms. Baldwin told Officer Inman that she had a warrant, Officer Inman had 
reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Kraly and Ms. Baldwin. (R., p.134.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Kraly entered a conditional plea to one count 
of attempted possession of methamphetamine, preserving his right to appeal the district 
2 
court's order denying his Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.224-35, Tr. 9/5/14, p.9, Ls.19-24.) 
is case was consolidated with case number CR 2014-611, which was scheduled for a 
disposition hearing following the court's finding that Mr. Kraly violated his probation by 
possessing methamphetamine. (Tr. 9/5/14, p.5, Ls.1-7, p.4, Ls.2-9.) The district court 
imposed a sentence of three years, with one and one-half years fixed, but suspended 
the sentence and placed Mr. Kraly on three years of probation with a recommendation 
for drug court. (Tr. 9/5/14, p.15, Ls.1-10.) 
Mr. Kraly filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court's judgment of 
conviction. (R., p.257.) 
3 
ISSUE 
district court err when it denied Mr. Kraly's Motion to Suppress? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kraly's Motion To Suppress Because 
Officer Inman Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Detain Him 
A Introduction 
The district court erred in denying Mr. Kraly's Motion to Suppress because 
Mr. Kraly's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police officers illegally 
detained him. As such, the district court's order denying Kraly's Motion to Suppress 
should be reversed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297 (Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals 
articulated the following standard of review for an appeal from a motion to suppress: 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely 
review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found At 
a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is 
vested in the trial court. 
Id. at 302 (citations omitted). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kraly's Motion To Suppress 
Because His Detention Was Illegal And, Therefore, Any Evidence Collected Must 
Be Suppressed As Fruit Of Illegal Government Activity 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The purpose of this constitutional right is to "impose a standard 
of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by governmental agents and thereby 
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safeguard an individual's privacy and security against arbitrary invasions." State v. 
137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002). When a defendant seeks to suppress 
evidence obtained as a result of an illegal seizure, the defendant bears the burden of 
proving that a seizure occurred. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841,843 (2004). "The test to 
determine if an individual is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes is an objective one" 
requiring an evaluation of "the totality of the circumstances." State v. Henage, 143 
Idaho 655, 658 (2007). A seizure under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs 
"when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way 
restrained the liberty of a citizen. State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 612 (2000) (quoting 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n 16 (1968)) 
1. Officer lnman's Initial Contact With Mr. Kraly Was A Seizure 
Because A Reasonable Person In Mr. Kraly's Position Would Not 
Have Felt Free To Leave 
In determining whether a seizure has taken place, the proper inquiry is "whether, 
under all the circumstances surrounding the encounter, a reasonable person would 
have felt free to leave or otherwise decline the officer's requests and terminate the 
encounter." State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652, 653 (1999), State v. Waldie, 126 Idaho 
864, 866 (Ct. App. 1995). 
In State v. Fry, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that police may ask a person 
questions and ask to examine identification without reasonable suspicion as long as 
they do not convey a message that compliance with the request is required. State v. 
Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 102 (1991). Additionally, if a police officer parks his patrol car in a 
way that blocks a person's exit route, that factor can be considered when determining 
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whether a seizure has occurred. Id.; see also State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 487-
(2009). 
The facts in Fry are very similar those here. In Fry, police officers observed a 
parked vehicle with two occupants in it. Id. at 101. An officer in full uniform approached 
the car and asked the occupants what they were doing while another officer stood 
behind the car. Id. The Court of Appeals stated, "Unlike other cases in which the police 
request the subject's cooperation in answering questions, the inquiry here as to what 
Fry was doing did not give Fry the option of answering or not." Id. at 103. The Court of 
Appeals further emphasized that the critical inquiry is whether, taking into account all of 
the circumstances surrounding the encounter, "the police conduct would have 
communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police 
presence and go about his business. Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 
(1991 )). 
Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Mr. Kraly's 
position would not have felt free to leave or to decline to answer questions. Officer 
Inman parked his patrol car in front of Mr. Kraly's parked car with the headlights shining 
into Mr. Kraly's windshield. (Tr., p.11, L.10 - p.12, L.24, p.20, Ls.2-17.) Although 
Mr. Kraly was not directly blocked in, he would have had to drive around the front of 
Officer lnman's patrol car or back out in order to drive away. (Tr., p.82, L.20 - p.83, L.5; 
State's Exhibit 2.) Officer Inman pointed his flashlight inside the car and directly into 
Ms. Baldwin's face. (Tr., p.57, Ls.18-24.) Similar to the situation in Fry, Officer Inman 
asked Mr. Kraly what they were doing and sked for identification. (Tr .. p.57, L.1 - p.58, 
L.9.) It should be noted that Idaho Code section 49-316 states: "Every licensee shall 
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have his driver's license in his immediate possession at all times when operating a 
vehicle and shall, upon demand, surrender the driver's license into the hands of a 
officer for his inspection. Mr. Kraly is presumed to know the law. See State v. 
Fox, 124 Idaho 924 (1993) (Ignorance of the law is not a defense) Therefore, it is 
presumed that Mr. Kraly is familiar with Idaho Code section 49-316 and would recognize 
that he must surrender his driver's license to a peace officer when it is requested 
Officer Inman testified that prior to Ms. Baldwin's statement about the warrant, he 
would have stopped Mr. Kraly if Mr. Kraly had attempted to drive away because of the 
"fidgeting" he observed. (Tr., p.73, L.18 - p.74, L.7.) Officer Inman stated that 
Mr. Kraly was seized as soon as he approached the car and saw Mr. Kraly fidgeting. 
(Tr., p.74, Ls.8-9.) Although the standard is an objective one, if Officer Inman did not 
believe Mr. Kraly was free to leave, he certainly was not communicating to Mr. Kraly 
that he was free to leave. Consequently, it is very unlikely that Mr. Kraly believed he 
was free to leave. Given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in 
Mr. Kraly's position would not have felt free to leave and, therefore, Officer lnman's 
contact with Mr. Kraly was a seizure. 
2. Officer Inman Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Detain 
Mr. Kraly 
An investigative detention is constitutionally permissible based upon reasonable 
suspicion, derived from specific articulable facts, that the person stopped has committed 
or is about to commit a crime. Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 21; State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 
260, 264 (Ct. App. 2001 ). Although the required information leading to formation of 
reasonable suspicion in the mind of the police officer is less than the information 
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required to form probable cause, it still "must be more than mere speculation or a hunch 
on the part of the police officer." State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 738 (Ct App. 2005). 
reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the 
circumstances at the time of the stop, and the "whole picture must yield a particularized 
and objective basis for suspecting that the individual being stopped is or has been 
engaged in wrongdoing. State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613,615 (Ct App. 1997). 
Here, the only information Officer Inman had when he detained Mr. Kraly was 
that Mr. Kraly's car was parked perpendicular to the parking stalls, the car did not have 
any lights on, and Mr. Kraly was "fidgeting" (Tr., p.48, L.4 - p.52, L9, p.56, Ls,9-13.) 
These facts do not amount to reasonable suspicion and, therefore, Officer lnman's 
detention of Mr. Kraly violated the Fourth Amendment 
D. All Evidence Collected Following The Illegal Detention Must Be Suppressed As It 
Is Fruit Of The Illegal Governmental Activity 
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only 
to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Segura v. United States, 468 
U.S. 796, 815; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Bainbridge, 
117 Idaho 245, 249 ( 1990). The test is "whether, granting establishment of the primary 
illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by 
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged 
of the primary taint." Wong Sun, supra, 371 U.S. at 488. Suppression is required if "the 
evidence sought to be suppressed would not have come to light but for the 
government's unconstitutional conduct" State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 
(Ct. App. 2005). 
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As discussed above, Officer Inman illegally detained Mr. Kraly. Had this 
detention not occurred, the methamphetamine in Mr. Kraly's car would not have been 
discovered The State failed to meet its burden of showing that the evidence is 
untainted; therefore, all the evidence collected after the impermissible seizure must be 
suppressed as fruit of the illegal police activity. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Kraly respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment and 
commitment, reverse the order denying his Motion to Suppress, and remand the case to 
the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 22nd day of September, 2015. 
ERIC~N 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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